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Although strenuous efforts have been made by a diverse set of talented and resourced 
advocates, Illinois’s K-12 school funding is stuck in a state of inadequacy and inequity. This 
Article defines the problem and traces constitutional, legislative, and litigation-based efforts to 
reform Illinois’s school funding formula over the past forty-five years. Taking the research 
supporting the need for funding equality and the circular nature of legislative efforts through 
2012 into account, wholesale funding reform must occur to ensure a bright future for Illinois’s 
children. 
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I. THE MOST IMPORTANT NUMBER IN EDUCATION: THE ZIP CODE 
Framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution knew there was work to be done in education 
finance.1 Overall, the delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention wanted change, but 
there was little agreement on how to achieve greater equity and adequacy in education funding.2 
As each proposal for a revised Education Article traveled through the Convention’s debate 
procedure, delegates simply could not agree.3 Some proposals went too far in increasing state 
control, while others did not go far enough to reduce the inequality between rich and poor 
districts.4 Simply put, although many delegates formed opinions as to what reforms should take 
place, no plan was floated that had the specificity to ensure equal education and popular appeal to 
make it out of the Convention.5 This led to frustration for most of the delegates; one delegate 
found himself “in a state of ambivalency,” while another stated “I don’t think the [first] 
amendment goes far enough; the [second] amendment doesn’t go anywhere; I want to go home. 
Let’s vote.”6 The convention delegates, worn out and tired, applauded this suggestion.7 
Almost forty-five years later, the feeling in Illinois is not much different, and the 
problem remains: the most important number in education is still a student’s zip code. A majority 
of legislators will agree that something should be done to better distribute resources to Illinois’s 
schools, but any discussion of school funding is complex and wrought with emotion. This has 
precluded any small, incremental steps from taking place, and the problem has only grown. The 
purpose of this Article is to further inform efforts to reform the system by defining the problem, 
explaining past attempts to change the system, and suggesting both incremental and wholesale 
reforms to make the school funding system more fair to schoolchildren and taxpayers. 
Part I of this Article establishes the disparity that exists in educational outcomes in 
Illinois, a problem rooted in the disparity in resources provided to schools. It also demonstrates 
that policy can have an impact in reducing this disparity, as evidenced by efforts in other states. 
Part II traces legislative reform efforts in Illinois, beginning in the 1970s, emphasizing the circular 
nature of debates and the need for wholesale change. Part III concludes by explaining why 
litigation has also failed so far in Illinois, and ends with an update of the most recent actions by 
advocates in litigation and in legislation. All of these parts come together to show that the future 
of Illinois public education depends on actions taken today and that wholesale, long-term change 
is needed to ensure a bright future for all Illinois children, not only those who live in wealthy 
areas. 
                                                                  
1  See generally Thomas D. Wilson & John K. Wilson, Equalizing School Funding and the 1970 
Constitutional Convention, 23 ILL. ISSUES 21 (1992).  
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 22. 
5  Id. at 21. 
6  Id. at 22. 
7  Id. 
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A. The Disparity 
The story of Chicago is similar to that of other great American cities. A promising 1800s 
prairie town characterized by quick growth, Chicago became one of the fastest growing cities in 
the world by the early 1900s.8 However, by the mid-1900s, resources quickly left, concentrating 
in suburbs surrounding the city.9 As those resources left the city, so did the people who could 
afford to move: mostly established, middle-upper class, white families.10 As these families left 
Chicago, black and Latino families moved in.11 The result was a socio-economically and racially 
segregated metropolitan region.12 
This segregation has rooted itself in Chicago. As recently as 2002, a South Side Catholic 
high school sports league refused to allow a primarily black parish to join, claiming that the black 
parish was “unsafe” for whites.13 The Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago at 
the time was forced to write a letter to priests, nuns, and laypeople in the region to urge them to 
welcome African-American parishioners.14 Ultimately, the black parish was eventually allowed to 
join.15 This segregation has not been limited to race, however. A 2010 study by the Pew Research 
Center noted that Chicago has experienced a modest increase in wealth segregation from 1980 to 
2010.16 This increase reflects a nationwide polarization; both the wealthy and the poor are 
concentrating in their own neighborhoods, while the overall share of mixed-income 
neighborhoods is shrinking.17 
Because of the way Illinois currently funds its schools, this segregation leads to 
educational inequity—not only in Chicago, but in all of Illinois.18 Illinois currently ranks in the 
bottom quintile among states for failing to fund its schools adequately from state-based revenue;19 
indeed, a majority of education funds are raised locally through property taxes.20 This has resulted 
                                                                  
8  ROBERT G. SPINNEY, CITY OF BIG SHOULDERS: A HISTORY OF CHICAGO 45-46 (2000). 
9  See id. at 204-12. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  See id. 
13  Op-Ed., Chicago, in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at A14. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION BY 
INCOME, (2012). Measured by the Residential Income Segregation Index (“RISI”), wealth segregation in the Chicago 
metropolitan area has grown by six points. Id. Although this increase is lower than most large metropolitan areas, it does 
reflect a general trend toward wealth segregation in the United States. Id. 
17  Id. 
18  See RALPH M. MARTIRE ET AL., CTR. FOR TAX & BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, MONEY MATTERS: HOW 
THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEM CREATES SIGNIFICANT EDUCATIONAL INEQUITIES THAT IMPACT MOST 
STUDENTS IN THE STATE 5 (2008). 
19  BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR. AND RUTGERS GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., IS SCHOOL 
FUNDING FAIR?: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 16 (3d ed. 2014). 
20  See  MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 5; see also Lisa Black, Spending Gap Between State’s Rich, Poor 
Schools is Vast, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2011. 
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in large disparities in spending among districts.21 Although Illinois ranked sixteenth in the United 
States in overall spending per pupil in 2011,22 a recent report written by The Education Trust 
placed Illinois dead last in spending its education dollars equally among rich and poor students.23 
Whereas Illinois districts spent, on average, $10,564 in districts with 30% of students in poverty, 
they spent $13,032 in districts near 0% of students in poverty.24 Despite state and federal 
programs assisting low-income districts, Illinois education funding is so reliant upon local 
property wealth that low-income districts only spend 81% of the amount wealthy districts do per 
pupil.25 This disparity in education funding has a remarkably disproportionate impact on students 
of color; 93% of all African-American children and 66% of all Hispanic children attend school 
districts in which 30% or more of the students are in poverty.26 
The most striking examples of this inequity exist in Chicagoland, where rich and poor 
districts lie in close proximity. For example, Rondout Elementary School, which serves a portion 
of Lake Forest in Lake County about twenty miles north of Chicago, spent $25,189 per student in 
the 2013-2014 school year, of which $15,476 was exclusively spent on instruction.27 Only 7% of 
students were of low-income status, and 81% of students were at or exceeding grade level on the 
Illinois Standards Achievement Test (“ISAT”).28 The median household income in Lake Forest 
from 2008 to 2012 was $147,162, and the median home value was $832,900.29 Students in 
Rondout Elementary School are not only exposed to a top-notch core educational program, but 
also have extracurricular opportunities such as art club, band, choir, ecology corps, an 
environmental club, Lego® robotics, the science Olympics, and various sports.30 
Compare this with Washington Irving Elementary School on the west side of Chicago. 
Washington Irving spent $13,791 per student in the 2013-2014 school year, with $8,624 going to 
instruction.31 Ninety-one percent of students were considered low-income, and fifty percent were 
at or exceeding grade level on the ISAT.32 During the same period, the median household income 
                                                                  
21  See MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 5. 
22  BAKER ET AL., supra note 19, at 12-13 tbl.2, 15 tbl.3. This data does not include information from Alaska 
or Hawaii. 
23  NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO MANY STATES STILL SPEND 
LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 4 (2015) [hereinafter FUNDING GAPS 2015], 
http://edtrust.org/resource/funding-gaps-2015/. 
24  Id. at 15. 
25  See id. 
26  MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 6. 
27  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., ILLINOIS REPORT CARD 2013-14, available at 
http://www.illinoisreportcard.com (enter “Rondout Elem School” on the home page). 
28  Id. 
29  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: LAKE FOREST (CITY), ILLINOIS (rev. 2015), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1741105.html (providing census data for the period between 2009 to 2013). 
30  RONDOUT SCH. & DIST. 72, EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, http://www.rondout.org/District/1741-
Extra-Curricular-Activities.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
31  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., ILLINOIS REPORT CARD, supra note 27 (enter “Irving Elem School” on home 
page, and select the school located in Chicago). 
32  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss3/1
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in the region was $47,408, and the median home value was $247,800.33 Although the school 
undoubtedly has dedicated, hard-working teachers and administration, resources do not exist for 
the menu of extracurricular activities offered at the Rondout School. Years of emphasis on test 
scores, a product of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,34 have resulted in many 
tumultuous years at the school, and this has disrupted the school’s distinguished educational 
progress.35 
B. The Illinois K-12 School Funding Formula 
This disparity between school resources is a result of the Illinois school funding formula. 
Funding for Illinois schools comes from three sources: the federal government (9%), the state 
government (27%), and local sources (64%).36 In the 2009-2010 school year, Illinois ranked forty-
eighth nationwide for state government contributions to schools;37 additionally, Illinois’s public 
school system was listed as one of the most regressively funded school systems in the country.38 
In this context, “regressive” indicates that as a district’s rate of low-income students increases, the 
district receives less money per pupil.39 The state’s lack of commitment to school funding has led 
to an overreliance on local property taxes raised individually by each district.40 Furthermore, the 
state’s efforts to reduce disparity in funding levels have been unsuccessful.41 
The majority of state funding is statutorily distributed in two ways: General State Aid42 
(“GSA”) and the Poverty Grant. The GSA is an equalization grant to ensure that every district 
achieves a statutory “foundation level” regardless of a district’s local property wealth.43 The 
foundation level was $6,119 per pupil in fiscal year 2014, less than half of the 2011 U.S. average 
of $12,608.44 The Poverty Grant is a supplemental grant, which increases along with the 
                                                                  
33  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 29. 
34  Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
35  See generally This American Life: Two Steps Back, CHI. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/275/two-steps-back. This radio broadcast described how 
increasing test scores in the late 1990s and early 2000s came about as the result of intra-school reforms initiated by the 
staff and administration of the school. Id. However, the score increases began to level out after directives from the 
Chicago Board of Education, as well as the federal government, unraveled the school-driven reforms. Id. 
36  AUGENBLICK, PALAICH, & ASSOCS., OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FINANCE 
SYSTEM 9 (2013), available at http://www.isbe.net/EFAC/schedule/testimony/130917/130924-apa-rpt.pdf. 
37 ADVANCE ILLINOIS, State Funding of Education: Per Pupil Expenditure by State, 
http://www.advanceillinois.org/state-funding-of-education-pages-329.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
38  BAKER ET AL., supra note 19, at 16; FUNDING GAPS 2015, supra note 23, at 4. 
39  See id. at 14.  
40  See MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 5-7. 
41  Id. at 8. 
42  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GENERAL STATE AID OVERVIEW—DEC. 2014, at 1 (rev. 2015), 
http://www.isbe.net/funding/pdf/gsa_overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) [hereinafter ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA 
OVERVIEW]; see 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05 (West 2014) (describing the basis for apportionment of general state 
financial aid to schools). 
43  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 1. 
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percentage of low-income students in a given district.45 
Illinois districts receive one of three different types of equalization grants based on their 
local property wealth per pupil.46 Using the Equalized Assessed Valuation (“EAV”) of each 
district from the Illinois Department of Revenue,47 the Illinois State Board of Education (“ISBE”) 
determines a district’s local property wealth and ability to pay by multiplying each district’s EAV 
by a standardized tax rate.48 This number is then divided by the number of students in each 
district, as determined by the average daily attendance in the district from the prior school year.49 
The resulting number is the Available Local Resources per student (“ALR”).50 
The first type of equalization grant is reserved for Illinois’s most property-wealthy 
school districts. The Flat Grant formula is applied to districts where the ALR is at least 175% of 
the foundation level.51 Flat Grant districts received $218 per pupil in the 2012-2013 school year.52 
The second type of equalization grant, the Alternative Formula, is applied to districts whose ALR 
is 93% to 175% of the foundation level.53 Districts in this category receive between 5% to 7% of 
the foundation level; this comes out to about $306 to $428 per pupil.54 The final type of 
equalization grant, the Foundation Formula, funds schools with the least ability to raise revenue.55 
For those school districts with ALR less than 93%, the Foundation Formula pays the difference 
between the district’s ALR and the statutory foundation level.56 In theory, then, no school district 
should ever fund education at less than the foundation level set by the Illinois General Assembly. 
The second largest portion of state aid is given to school districts based on their 
proportion of at-risk pupils, also known as a “poverty grant.”57 The poverty grant starts at $355 
per pupil for districts where low-income student enrollment hovers around 15%, and increases 
along with the percentage of low-income students, topping out at $2,994.25 for those districts 
                                                                  
44  Id.; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FAST FACTS (2013), 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=66 (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
45  Id.; Fact Sheet: Changing Illinois Public School Demographics and Education Funding, ILL. STATE BD. 
OF EDUC. (Mar. 2013), http://www.isbe.net/budget/FY14/fact-sheet3-demo-funding.pdf. 
46  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 1-2; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(E)(2) 
to (4). 
47  ILL. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PUBLICATION 136: PROPERTY ASSESSMENT AND EQUALIZATION (2010), 
available at http://tax.illinois.gov/publications/pubs/pub-136.pdf. The Equalized Assessed Value reflects the property 
value of each district; specifically, it is 33.3% of the average market value of the property contained in a district. Id. For 
more on how this value is generated, see id. 
48  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 7; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(D). 
49  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(C). 
50  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(D). 
51  MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 6. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. at 5-6; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(E). 
54  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 2. 
55  Id.; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(E). 
56  Id. at 6. 
57  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 2; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(H). 
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with 90% to 100% low-income enrollment.58 Again, in theory, assuming that the equalization 
grant and poverty grants are working correctly, no high-poverty district should be funded less 
than around $8,000 per pupil.59 It is important, however, to keep in mind that $8,000 still remains 
more than $3,000 below the 2011 Illinois average of $11,330, $4,000 below the same year’s U.S. 
average of $12,608, and one-third the amount of money that wealthy schools like Rondout 
Elementary spent per student in Illinois in the same year.60 
The rest of state support is distributed through block grants, each with a different purpose 
and different system for distributing funds.61 The block grants fund areas such as early childhood 
education, school safety, reading improvement, and special education.62 Chicago District 299 also 
receives a separate block grant, which removes it from much of the state funding formula.63 Each 
block grant has its own system of distribution and regulation, increasing administrative overhead 
and decreasing transparency.64 
C. Neither Equitable Nor Adequate 
The conversation about equity in education has shifted over time. Brown v. Board of 
Education,65 handed down in 1954, kicked off years of litigation and legislative efforts to make 
schools more equitable. Yet, even though disparity in schools never disappeared, the conversation 
shifted from equity to adequacy in the 1990s.66 The argument for adequacy is simple: whereas 
equity focuses on equalizing financial inputs for all children, adequacy focuses on equalizing 
educational outputs, such as test scores.67 The debate between prioritizing equity or adequacy lies 
outside the scope of this Article; however, the fact the debate exists is worth mentioning. Even 
more, the argument between equity and adequacy should not distract from the fact that the Illinois 
                                                                  
58  ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 2. 
59  See generally id. The equalization grant is designed to bring the district to the foundation level—$6,119 
in FY2014—while the Poverty Grant maxes out at $2,994.25 for districts with the highest percentages of students in 
poverty. Id. at 1-2. Adding these together, poor districts should receive around $8,000 to $9,000 per pupil. 
60  See BAKER ET AL., supra note 19, at 12-13; ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., GSA OVERVIEW, supra note 42, at 
1; see discussion at supra note 27. 
61  SENATE EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY COMM., GEN. ASSEMBLY, STATE OF ILL., SENATE EDUC. FUNDING 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT 3 (2014), available at http://www.isbe.net/EFAC/pdf/efac-final-report013114.pdf. 
62  See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1C-2 (West 2014) (early childhood education block grant); 105 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-3.51.5 (West 2014) (school safety block grant); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3.51a (West 2014) (reading 
improvement block grant); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-7.02b (West 2014) (special education); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/1D-1 (West 2014) (Chicago block grant). 
63  See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1D-1 (describing the Chicago block grant). The statute makes the grant 
available to all cities with populations over 500,000, but Chicago is the only such city in the state, by a large margin. See 
Illinois Cities by Population, ILL. DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT, http://www.illinois-demographics.com/cities_by_population 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
64  Id. 
65  347 U.S. 686 (1954). 
66  William H. Clune, The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL’Y 376, 376-77 
(1994). 
67  Id. at 377. 
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school funding formula provides neither equity nor adequacy for Illinois children. This 
inadequacy and inequity can be split into two different categories: broken promises, and the 
downward spiral caused by inequity. 
1. Broken Promises 
In December of 1997, the Illinois General Assembly created the Education Funding 
Advisory Board (“EFAB”) by the passage of Public Act 90-548.68 EFAB was to be made up of 
representatives of education, business, and the general public and charged with making yearly 
recommendations to the General Assembly on education spending.69 Specifically, EFAB was to 
develop a methodology based on best spending practices gleaned from low-income, high-
performing school districts.70 From this methodology, EFAB would then make a recommendation 
on the foundation level.71 
After commissioning a report on the funding strategies of high-performing, low-spending 
school districts from the consulting firm Augenblick & Myers in 2001, EFAB adopted the firm’s 
findings to develop its first recommended foundation level in January 2001.72 The General 
Assembly adopted the recommended level of $4,560 per pupil for fiscal year 2002.73 In that first 
year, the system worked as intended. 
However, 2002 is the only year the General Assembly actually followed the 
recommendation of EFAB.74 Since 2002, the General Assembly has set the statutory foundation 
level below—sometimes thousands of dollars below—the recommendations of the board it 
formed.75 The difference between the EFAB-recommended amount and the actual amount set in 
law by the General Assembly, adjusted for inflation, was at first only $120 per pupil in 2003.76 By 
fiscal year 2014, however, the difference had grown to over $2,500 per pupil.77 Whereas EFAB 
recommended the foundation level be $8,672 per student, the General Assembly set the 
foundation level at $6,119—a level that has not been increased since fiscal year 2010.78 
                                                                  
68  1997 Ill. Legis. Serv., 1st Spec. Sess., Pub. Act No. 90-548 (West 1997) (codified as amended at 105 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(M) (West 2015)); see EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY BD., ILLINOIS EDUCATION FUNDING 
RECOMMENDATIONS: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (2013) [hereinafter EFAB 2013 
RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.isbe.net/EFAB/pdf/final-report-01-13.pdf. 
69  EFAB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 68, at 2. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. at 8; see AUGENBLICK & MYERS, A PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING A BASE COST FIGURE & AN 
ADJUSTMENT FOR AT-RISK PUPILS THAT COULD BE USED IN THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM (2001), available at 
http://www.isbe.net/EFAB/archive/PDFs/fullreport.pdf. The firm has since changed its name to Augenblick, Palaich and 
Associates. 
73  EFAB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 68, at 8. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 8-9. 
76  Id. at 9. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 2 (showing the EFAB-recommended foundation level); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(B) (noting 
the foundation level set by the General Assembly). 
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Furthermore, the General Assembly is not even funding the lower $6,119 figure they set 
in statute.79 Breaking its promise to Illinois school districts and the children they serve, by fiscal 
year 2013, the General Assembly was funding the foundation level at $518 million less than what 
would be needed to fully fund schools under its own GSA funding formula.80 As a result, Illinois 
districts were paid only 89% of what they were statutorily entitled to receive from the state, a 
function that has become known as “proration.”81 
It follows that those districts that are more reliant on state aid, which are almost always 
property-poor districts with a higher percentage of low-income students, are hardest hit by such 
broken promises. As EFAB admonished in its January 2013 report to the General Assembly, 
“[w]hile EFAB recognizes the dire financial position of the State of Illinois, the lack of adequate 
funding for basic education is a failure of the state’s moral and fiduciary responsibilities.”82 
Pointing to Article X, Section 1 of the Illinois State Constitution,83 EFAB found the state is not 
meeting its constitutional responsibility to finance schooling for Illinois children, not only by 
setting its goals for education finance far too low, but also by failing to even meet those reduced 
goals.84 
2. The Downward Spiral of Inequity 
The effects of Illinois’s over-reliance on property taxes to fund education ripple beyond 
district finances. This over-reliance has also made it more difficult for less wealthy areas to attract 
jobs and build their own property value and wealth. Because areas with less property value must 
tax at a higher rate to make up for a lower EAV per pupil, such areas are less likely to attract 
industrial and commercial business.85 The average property tax rate for Foundation Formula 
districts, those districts with the least property value, was 7.84% in 2004, while the average rate in 
Alternative Formula and Flat Grant districts was 3.06% and 2.12%, respectively.86 This reliance 
on property taxes contributes to Illinois’s status as one of the most regressive tax states in the 
country, taxing lower-income individuals at a higher percentage than higher-income individuals.87 
                                                                  
79  EFAB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 68, at 9. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 7. 
82  Id. at 12. 
83  See Ill. Const. art. X, § 1, providing:  
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the 
limits of their capacities.  
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and 
services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such 
other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.  
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education. 
Id. 
84  EFAB 2013 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 68, at 12. 
85  MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 8. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
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Further, from 1990 to 2005, the real growth in property tax rates in Illinois was 42.12%, even 
though incomes rose by only 2.84% in the same time period.88 
This contributes to communities losing the ability to help themselves. Employers have 
little financial motivation to stay in communities with high property tax rates and struggling local 
schools when there are nearby areas with lower tax rates and better-resourced schools for 
employees’ children.89 This creates a downward spiral as companies, jobs, and corporate 
resources leave a school district’s community.90 Resulting drops in EAV (used to compute 
property taxes) cause tax rates to rise as districts struggle to fund schools.91 This affects every 
Illinois resident who pays property tax. As taxes rise, the incentive to stay in the community 
drops, and people and businesses leave.92 As people and businesses leave, the economic fabric of 
the community is torn, often leading to an accelerating rate of closing storefronts and “For Sale” 
signs in yards, and taxes must rise once more to compensate for a smaller tax base.93 At the center 
of those impacted are the community’s children, who had no choice as to where they were born, 
where they live, or where they attend school. Illinois’s children deserve better. 
D. Does More Money Equal Better Education? 
Inquiries into whether more resources improve academic outcomes have been 
inconsistent and dependent on the specific context of each state or district being studied.94 
Although concrete conclusions are difficult to reach, there are truths that can be extracted from a 
collective look at these studies. For example, although statistical evidence indicates a rough 
correlation between resources and student achievement, the research suggests that simply adding 
money to the system without changing how schools are managed does not result in increased 
student performance.95 
Economist Gary Burtless’s research in this area, although it was conducted almost 
twenty years ago, includes contributions from prominent economists around the country such as 
James Heckman and Frank Levy, and remains one of the prominent works regarding the 
effectiveness of school resources.96 In his work, Burtless splits studies in education resource 
effectiveness into two distinct strands.97 The first strand analyzes whether an increase in school 
                                                                  
88  Id. 
89  See id. (“Over time, [property tax reliance] is likely to drive industrial and commercial businesses out of 
low and moderate income communities to wealthier ones, to take advantage of the benefits of lower property tax rates 
coupled with better local schools, and hence higher skilled local workers.”). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  See id. 
94  See Gary Burtless, Introduction and Summary, in DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL 
RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 1, 40 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996) (summarizing a number of 
different studies, all based on different metrics, that come to differing conclusions on whether an increase in resources 
equals an increase in student achievement). 
95  Id. at 41. 
96  See generally id. 
97  Id. at 3. 
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resources typically increases student success while the students are still in school.98 The second 
asks whether more resources in education improve outcomes when students graduate and enter 
the labor market.99 
1. Funding and Student Achievement 
Economist Eric Hanushek published the preeminent study of the first strand in the 
Journal of Economic Literature in 1986.100 Hanushek concluded that “there appears to be no 
strong or systematic relationship between school expenditures and student performance.”101 At 
face value, Hanushek’s exhaustive analysis of more than 377 data points from over 90 published 
works leads to a compelling argument against simply increasing resources.102 However, Hanushek 
does not conclude that increasing resources cannot result in higher student achievement, but that 
there is little reason to assume that an increase in resources—without any other changes in school 
organization—will result in higher achievement.103 Further, he claims that the results point to the 
conclusion that added resources will not have a consistent effect across schools.104 “[The 
research] indicates, by implication, that the existing proclivities of school decisionmakers [sic] do 
little to ensure effective use of resources,” writes Hanushek.105 
The root of Hanushek’s conclusions lies in the statistical insignificance of many findings 
across published works in the area.106 For example, in an analysis of 207 studies searching for a 
correlation between teacher experience and student achievement, Hanushek finds that 66 are 
statistically insignificant;107 in other words, in those 66 studies, negative effects may be as likely 
to result from an increase in resources as positive effects.108 However, of the statistically 
significant studies, twenty-nine show a positive correlation between teacher experience and 
student achievement, while only five show a negative correlation.109 Of the studies Hanushek has 
labeled statistically insignificant, thirty show a positive correlation, twenty-four a negative 
                                                                  
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100  Id.; see Eric Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1141 (1986). 
101  Burtless, supra note 94, at 3 (quoting Hanushek, supra note 100, at 1162) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
102  See Eric Hanushek, School Resources and Student Performance, in DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE 
EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 43, 55-57 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996) 
(contextualizing the studies, explaining statistical insignificance of many seemingly correlative rises in spending and 
achievement). 
103  Id. at 57. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 57-58. 
106  Id. at 56. 
107  See id. at 54 tbl.2-3. 
108  Id. at 56 n.21. 
109  Id. at 54 tbl.2-3. 
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correlation, and twelve are unknown.110 Statistical significance, then, is crucial to Hanushek’s 
conclusions.111 
Many have opposed Hanushek’s findings.112 Larry Hedges and Rob Greenwald attack an 
assumption in Hanushek’s conclusions: that the cost and production of student achievement over 
the years analyzed in Hanushek’s calculations are constant.113 Hedges and Greenwald argue that 
this assumption is incorrect, specifically noting that the level and comprehensiveness of education 
has increased while the social capital available to students has decreased.114 
Hedges and Greenwald first disagree with the metrics Hanushek used to measure student 
achievement.115 They focus on Hanushek’s use of the SAT (formerly known as the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test), and specifically his conclusion that falling SAT scores since 1960 indicate lower 
academic achievement among America’s schoolchildren.116According to Hedges and Greenwald, 
the SAT is a flawed social indicator as the population taking the test is self-selected.117 Indeed, the 
current general understanding is that this self-selection process, and the resulting fluctuation in 
who is taking the test, accounts for much of the decline in test scores.118 Hedges and Greenwald 
quote a study that Hanushek cites to come to this conclusion: “[S]election and composition factors 
‘exaggerated the drop in scores on the SAT-Verbal by about 75 percent and the decline in the 
reading comprehension scores of students taking the SAT by about 125 percent.’”119 Because of 
these problems, statisticians tend to avoid SAT scores as a social indicator. 
Hedges and Greenwald also attack Hanushek’s reliance upon National Assessment of 
Educational Progress data, disagreeing with Hanushek’s conclusion drawn from the data.120 For 
example, they point out that even though the achievement of white students remained fairly stable 
between 1975 and 1992, scores in reading and math for black and Hispanic students rose by 
roughly one-half of a standard deviation.121 These increases were concurrent to increases in 
school funding over the same time.122 These specifics are part of an overall picture that has shown 
modest increases in scores overall, while the scores of black and Hispanic students have risen 
                                                                  
110  Id. 
111  See id. at 55-58 (rejecting a number of studies that find positive correlations between an increase in 
resources and an increase in achievement because of statistical insignificance). 
112  Burtless, supra note 94, at 9. 
113  Larry V. Hedges & Rob Greenwald, Have Times Changed?: The Relation Between School Resources 
and Student Performance, in DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 
AND ADULT SUCCESS 74, 74-75 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996). 
114  Id. at 75. 
115  See id. at 75-76. 
116  Id. at 77; see Hanushek, supra note 102, at 47-48. 
117  Hedges & Greenwald, supra note 113, at 76-77.  
118  Id. at 77. 
119  Id. (citing DANIEL KORETZ, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT: EXPLANATIONS 
AND IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TRENDS 103 (1987)). 
120  Id. at 77-79. 
121  Id. at 78. 
122  Id. 
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substantially.123 
Lastly, Hedges and Greenwald couple this data with sociology, highlighting data that 
they argue shows that the social capital in American families dropped significantly between 1960 
and 1990.124 For example, the percentage of children with mothers in the workforce increased 
from 10% in 1940 to 59% in 1990.125 Further, the number of children living only with their 
mothers increased from nearly 7% in 1940 to 20% in 1990; the authors assume that children who 
live with only one parent have fewer resources, both financially and socially.126 Hedges and 
Greenwald use this data to argue that increases in school funding actually prevented declines in 
school achievement that would have resulted from diminishing social capital.127 
The take-away from this debate seems to be that statisticians and economists are working 
with immensely complex and constantly shifting data in their quest to determine the effects of 
increased school funding. It seems that almost every data point has a contextual caveat, and that 
only by looking at the entire universe of study on the subject can one come to a conclusion. That 
conclusion seems to be that there is no proof that simply increasing funding, without changing the 
way schools are run, will increase scores. However, strong evidence exists that without previous 
funding increases, student achievement would have dropped, as described above. This debate has 
also failed to confront growth in the comprehensiveness of American education, from increases in 
social services provided in schools to expensive technological and physical plant demands. 
2. Funding and Outcomes in the Labor Market 
The second strand of research focuses on what happens to students when they leave 
school. Using the almost universally accepted position that advanced degrees lead to higher 
earnings, the logical next step is that increasing resources in schools, and thus the quality of 
schools, will result in the same.128 Increasing the quantity of schooling typically has a return on 
investment in the range of 5% to 12%, after controlling for factors such as race and family 
background.129 
Quality of schooling also seems to affect future earnings and productivity. In the 1950s, 
there was a large gap in the earnings gains that black men and white men received for years of 
additional schooling.130 At that time, most black workers came from segregated and severely 
underfunded schools, leading to the reasonable inference that a lack of quality in schooling led to 
the gap.131 Calculations of earnings profiles from the 1960s showed a narrowing in the return on 
investment for additional schooling between black and white men entering the labor force.132 This 
                                                                  
123  Id. at 79. 
124  Id. tbl.3-2. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 79-80. 
127  Id. at 80.  
128  Burtless, supra note 94, at 12. 
129  Id. at 13. 
130  Id.  
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 13-14. 
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is concurrent with a progressive equalization in the amount of money spent on young black and 
white students in the same time period.133 It follows, therefore, that increased school funding has 
the potential to close the racial achievement gap, not only during Americans’ school-age years, 
but also when they enter the workforce. 
Further, a 1992 study by labor economists David Card and Alan B. Krueger, using data 
from the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Census Bureau, concluded that increased 
expenditures in education led to higher earnings for workers.134 Particularly, policy decisions such 
as lengthening the school year, reducing the teacher-student ratio, and raising teacher salaries led 
to gains in states’ return on investment via higher earnings.135 For example, lowering the teacher-
student ratio by five students correlated with a 0.4% increase in the rate of return attributed to 
schooling, while a 10% increase in teacher salaries correlated with a 0.1% increase in the rate of 
return.136 
However, this conclusion has not gone unquestioned. Using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (“NLSY”), a survey of young people spanning the years from 1979 to 1990, 
Professor Julian R. Betts came to a different conclusion.137 In summary, Betts discovered that the 
more specific the data he used, the less significant the correlation between increased educational 
inputs and future earnings for students.138 Betts cast doubt on Card and Krueger’s use of statewide 
data to determine educational input. When Card and Krueger conducted their study, they had no 
data on the actual schools attended by the census respondents, and resorted to applying the 
educational input of the state in which the respondents were educated.139 Instead of statewide 
data, Betts applied the input from the actual schools attended by the NLSY respondents.140 Betts 
found that the level of resources put into the NLSY respondents’ education had no statistically 
significant effect on the respondents’ future earnings.141 Despite a large statistical standard error 
in his estimates, Betts’ study did certainly question Card and Krueger’s findings.142 Betts was able 
to essentially replicate their findings when applying broader, less specific statewide data, but 
when Betts applied the data specific to each respondent, much of the correlation between 
educational resources and earnings disappeared.143 
                                                                  
133  Id. at 14. 
134  Burtless, supra note 94, at 14-15 (citing David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Does School Quality Matter?: 
Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1992)).  
135  Id. at 15. 
136  Id.  
137  Id. (citing Julian R. Betts, Does School Quality Matter?: Evidence from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 231 (1995)). 
138  Id. at 16. 
139  Id.  
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
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3. Conclusions for Illinois K-12 Funding 
Against this background, the data for Illinois will be examined here. Although the 
research on the effects of increasing educational resources is conflicting, some conclusions can be 
made. First, there is a much better chance of improvement in achievement if a school is well-
resourced. Second, evidence supports the theory that increases in resources over the past fifty 
years have narrowed disparities between racial and social groups. Third, when coupled with well-
informed decisions at the district and school levels, increasing resources does correlate with 
increasing achievement.144 
With these themes in mind, it certainly seems that higher expenditures for education 
result in higher achievement in Illinois. Students’ scores on the Prairie State Achievement Exam, 
the state test taken by high school students, rise in every subject with increasing amounts of 
money spent by district.145 In Foundation Formula districts, the average scores are 157, 156, and 
157 in reading, math, and science, respectively.146 Compare this with average scores of 160, 159, 
and 160 in Alternative Formula schools, and 163, 163, and 164, respectively, in Flat Grant 
schools.147 Even more, 90% of eighth grade students in Flat Grant districts meet or exceed ISAT 
reading and math standards, whereas the figure in Foundation Formula districts is 80%.148 
Flat Grant districts spend, on average, $4,186 more per pupil than Foundation Formula 
districts.149 Teachers in Flat Grant districts get paid almost $18,000 more per year than those in 
Foundation Formula districts, and nearly 63% of Flat Grant teachers hold a master’s degree, 
compared with 37% of teachers in Foundation Formula districts.150 In a study measuring Illinois 
schools with a 3% to 8% low-income rate, student performance rose as school spending increased 
from $5,000 per student to $7,000 per student.151 This measurement, after being controlled for 
family environment, supports the proposition that “a meaningful improvement in [students’] 
academic performance correlates directly with an added investment in instruction,” even with the 
advantages that come with being middle- or upper-class.152 A similar result occurred when this 
test was applied to districts with 27% to 32% low-income rates.153 
                                                                  
144  Compare Hanushek, supra note 102, at 68-69, with Richard J. Murnane & Frank Levy, Evidence from 
Fifteen Schools in Austin, Texas, in DOES MONEY MATTER?: THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 93, 96 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996) (“We conclude with a summary [of a school 
principal]: ‘I think money is a good thing. Money is the answer to the problems in education, with the caveat that it’s spent 
and invested wisely.’ We do not believe either Hanushek or Hedges would disagree with this statement . . . This 
conclusion is consistent with both their statistical summaries; it is also consistent with the theme of the Card-Krueger 
work.”). 
145  MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 10. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id.  
149  Id. at 11. 
150  Id. at 9. 
151  Id. at 11. 
152  Id. at 12. 
153  Id. 
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One of most striking elements of Illinois school funding is that Foundation Formula 
districts (the lowest-funded) cover almost 80% of Illinois schoolchildren.154 The vast majority of 
Flat Grant districts lie in the northern third of the state, primarily in the suburbs of Chicago.155 
Only three Flat Grant districts are located “downstate,” making overall educational investment in 
Illinois concentrated in the northern third of the state.156 
When it comes to exploring whether increased expenditures create better outcomes for 
schoolchildren and society, the research, based on shifting metrics and sometimes inadequate 
data, can be misleading. But when one examines the actual academic outcomes in Illinois, it 
becomes extremely difficult to dismiss resource inequity as having no effect on achievement. The 
conflicting and complex nature of research in this area should not become a red herring, 
distracting from the inequitable and inadequate state of school finance in Illinois. Advocates for 
reform should strive to maintain focus on the goals of full funding and equity, and should 
acknowledge what the actual numbers from Illinois support: that expenditures matter. 
After all, if expenditures truly have no effect on outcomes, then solving the Illinois 
budget crisis becomes far easier. The highest-spending Flat Grant districts should study high-
performing, low-spending districts and emulate them, cutting their high spending levels to match. 
This could cut some Flat Grant districts’ budgets by 60%. No wealthy community, however, 
would allow this to happen. They have the common sense to know what all Illinoisans know: 
more resources mean a higher quality and more well-rounded education. 
E. Models for Successful Reform in Other States 
Taking the United States as a whole, districts with the highest percentage of students in 
poverty receive about $1,200 less per student than the lowest poverty districts.157 Fortunately, a 
number of states are working to redirect dollars to districts with the highest student need.158 
Reform efforts in Kentucky and Massachusetts provide useful lessons. 
1. Kentucky: A Focus on Schoolchildren 
In the 1989 case Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,159 the Kentucky Supreme 
Court declared the entire Kentucky school system unconstitutional and directed the General 
Assembly to redesign schooling in Kentucky.160 The court held that the state was not meeting the 
requirement of the state constitution’s education clause, and specifically that the Kentucky 
General Assembly was not providing an “efficient system of common schools throughout the 
state.”161 In coming to its decision, the court highlighted the “jigsaw puzzle” nature of Kentucky’s 
                                                                  
154  Id. at 11-12. 
155  Id. at 13. 
156  Id.  
157  FUNDING GAPS 2015, supra note 23, at 3. 
158  Id. 
159  790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
160  Id. at 215.  
161  Id.  
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then-existing school finance system.162 This system had resulted in large inequalities between 
property-wealthy and property-poor districts, with locally generated revenues ranging from $80 
per pupil to $3,716 per pupil.163 The court held that this disparity was unconstitutional and a direct 
result of the General Assembly’s failure “to establish an efficient system of common schools 
throughout the Commonwealth.”164 
As a result, the court ordered the General Assembly to create a school finance system 
that met its definition of the word “efficient” found in the Kentucky Constitution.165 Specifically, 
that definition required the General Assembly to adhere to three guiding concepts: adequacy, 
uniformity, and equal opportunity for all schoolchildren.166 The new funding mechanism needed 
to correct prior policies that led to inequality.167 However, the court explicitly allowed individual 
districts—if the General Assembly created them in their full overhaul of the system—to tax over 
and above what the state decided to spend per student.168 
The Kentucky General Assembly responded swiftly and within the restrictions placed on 
it by the court.169 The response was entitled the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 
(“KERA”).170 The funding formula portion of KERA, called Support Education Excellence in 
Kentucky (“SEEK”), consists of a five-part system that equalizes funding across the state, yet 
provides local districts flexibility to raise funds over the state’s base guarantee per pupil.171 
The first element of SEEK ensures that each district receives a base guarantee per 
pupil—essentially a foundation level.172 Additionally, the General Assembly formed the 
Kentucky Office of Education Accountability to oversee education for the Assembly.173 One of 
the duties this office has undertaken is recommending increases in the base guarantee when 
appropriate; the committee has suggested annual increases in the range of 4% to 5%.174 In 1997, 
Jacob E. Adams, Jr. and William E. White II published a study of the effects of SEEK, indicating 
that the General Assembly increased the base guarantee regularly from 1990 to 1995.175 
The second element of SEEK involves weighted adjustments for students with special 
                                                                  
162  Id. at 199.  
163  Jacob E. Adams, Jr. & William E. White II, The Equity Consequence of School Finance Reform in 
Kentucky, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 165, 167 (1997). 
164  Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.  
165  Id. 
166  Adams & White, supra note 163, at 168.  
167  Id.  
168  Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211-12. 
169  See Adams & White, supra note 163, at 165, 169. 
170  Id. at 165; see generally Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, 1990 KY. ACTS ch. 476 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. chs. 156-68 (West 2015)). 
171  Adams & White, supra note 163, at 169.  
172  Id.  
173  Id.  
174  Id.  
175  Id. 
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needs.176 SEEK provides a higher base rate for at-risk, exceptional, and home- and hospital-bound 
children.177 Within these larger categories are smaller increments in weight.178 For example, 
within the special needs category, there are additional weights for severe (2.35 times), moderate 
(1.17 times), and minor speech- and hearing-disabled students (0.24 times).179 SEEK also 
provides a weighted adjustment for costs of transporting children who live a mile or more from 
their schools.180 The result of applying these three weights to the base guarantee is the “adjusted 
base guarantee.”181 
The first two elements of SEEK are very similar to Illinois’s foundation formula and 
poverty weighting, but the third element of SEEK diverges from Illinois’s current system. 
SEEK’s third element requires a local contribution based on a $0.30 tax per $100 of assessed 
property value.182 The state then fills the gap between the local contribution requirement and the 
base guarantee level set by the government.183 This effectively sets a baseline contribution, 
preventing districts from reducing taxes to take advantage of state aid. 
In elements four and five, SEEK ensures that districts that wish to fund their schools 
above the base guarantee are able to do so.184 SEEK’s fourth element, called the “Tier I 
guaranteed tax base,” allows school boards to raise revenues up to an additional 15% of the base 
guarantee without putting the issue before voters.185 The state also provides equalization funds for 
any property-poor district—a district with less than 150% of the state average property wealth 
per-pupil—that elects to raise Tier I funds.186 This ensures that all districts receive equal support 
for equal effort.187 
Lastly, SEEK allows districts to raise “Tier II local revenue.”188 School boards have the 
option of raising additional revenue up to 30% of the sum of the adjusted base guarantee and Tier 
I funds after approval from the electorate.189 There are no equalization funds available for Tier II 
revenue.190 In essence, then, Tier II revenue acts as a cap, ensuring that disparity between rich and 
poor districts stays relatively low.191 
                                                                  
176  Id.  
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  Id. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
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KERA and SEEK have been effective in reducing the disparity among Kentucky’s 
schools.192 After the enactment of KERA and SEEK, schools with the most funding received 1.6 
times more money than schools with the least funding, whereas before, the highest-funded 
schools received 2.5 times more revenue than the least-funded.193 The gap between the richest and 
poorest district (by per-pupil revenue) dropped 22%, from $2,050 to $1,590.194 This does not 
mean that schools suffered. Not only do KERA and SEEK have “hold-harmless” provisions 
preventing immediate drops in funding for wealthy districts, the mean revenue per pupil among 
all districts in Kentucky grew from $2,334 to $3,262 between 1989 and 1992.195 The actions of 
the Kentucky General Assembly after the Kentucky Supreme Court holding in Rose are a prime 
example of government working to solve a politically tough policy problem. 
Over twenty years after the enactment of KERA and SEEK, Kentucky still ranks highly 
among states in the equitable distribution of education funds, receiving an “A” from the 
Education Law Center in its 2014 school funding report.196 Indeed, the Kentucky General 
Assembly is still actively working toward equity, and in late March of 2014, the General 
Assembly formed a subcommittee to assess whether SEEK is still working effectively.197 
2. Massachusetts: State Funding with Local Control 
Kentucky’s efforts in the early 1990s became a model for effective school finance 
reform, even for a state that typically is a leader in education: Massachusetts. McDuffy v. 
Secretary of the Executive Office of Education,198 decided in 1993 by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, was Massachusetts’s version of Rose. In McDuffy, the court relied on the state 
constitution’s education clause to hold that Massachusetts was not fulfilling its constitutional 
duty.199 The court held that there was “an enforceable duty on the magistrates and [l]egislatures of 
this [c]ommonwealth to provide education in the public schools for the children there enrolled, 
whether they be rich or poor and without regard to the fiscal capacity of the community or district 
in which such children live.”200 Because the court held that the state violated this duty, it required 
that the legislature take steps to meet the constitutional mandate, and the court maintained 
jurisdiction to ensure that the state meet this mandate “within a reasonable time.”201 
Just as in Kentucky, the Massachusetts legislature moved quickly to fulfill the court’s 
mandate. Later in 1993, the governor of Massachusetts signed the Massachusetts Education 
                                                                  
192  Id. at 173. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. at 174. 
196  BAKER ET AL., supra note 19, at 15.  
197  Valarie Honeycutt Spears, Study Would Determine Whether Formula Provides Adequate Funds for 
Kentucky Schools, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.kentucky.com/2014/03/24/3159336/study-
would-determine-whether.html. 
198  615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
199  Id. at 555; see Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2 (expressing the state’s commitment to education). 
200  615 N.E.2d at 555. 
201  Id. at 556. 
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Reform Act (“MERA”) into law.202 The funding aspects of the law were closely aligned with 
Kentucky’s KERA, but there were differences, primarily in how local control of each district was 
promoted.203 MERA, unlike KERA, formed councils at each Massachusetts school, comprised of 
teachers, the principal of the school, parents, and community members.204 These councils acted 
similarly to mini-school boards, taking decision-making down to the school level.205 
This decentralized decision-making sets Massachusetts apart from most other states that 
have instituted education reforms. One of the oft-cited critiques of injecting more money into a 
school system is that the money simply will not be used effectively and will not result in higher 
academic performance.206 However, after MERA’s provisions were in full force, districts spent 
79% of new money on “capital expenditures or the direct, instruction-related interactions of 
students and teachers.”207 Although this does not fully support the proposition that money was not 
wasted, capital expenditures and instruction-related expenses are two areas that educational 
policymakers typically hold as priorities.208 It seems that MERA’s decentralized, local control 
provisions worked to divert dollars to where they were most effective.209 
MERA was successful in diverting more dollars to the poorest districts in the state.210 
Additionally, MERA caused districts to change the way that they spent money.211 Although 
revenues increased by $556 per pupil between 1990 and 1996, actual per-pupil spending increased 
by $962.212 This was coupled with increases in both capital and instructional expenditures, and 
decreases in non-instructional expenditures.213 Some of this difference could be explained by 
sampling variation, or working cash versus debt held by these districts. However, there is enough 
data to support the proposition that MERA effectively led to a significant increase in per-student 
spending.214 This data supports a case for making decentralized decision-making and procedural 
and organizational reform key components of any school finance reform package intended to 
                                                                  
202  Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993, 1993 Mass. Acts ch. 71 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS chs. 69-71 (West 2015)); Thomas S. Dee & Jeffrey Levine, The Fate of New Funding: 
Evidence from Massachusetts’ Education Finance Reforms, 26 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 199, 201 (2004). 
203  See id. at 201-02 (describing how MERA established a foundation level, required districts to contribute 
revenue, and rewarded districts with more support for more effort in raising local revenues). 
204  Id. at 201.  
205  Id. at 201, 203. 
206  See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 9040, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9040. 
207  Dee & Levine, supra note 202, at 212. 
208  Id. 
209  Id. (“Another interesting dimension to these results and the Massachusetts experience is that this 
allocation of new revenues occurred despite the conspicuous absence of state-level regulations on how school districts 
should spend these new resources. Instead, these finance reforms were accompanied by organizational changes that 
promoted the local involvement and decision-making authority of parents, principals and teachers.”). 
210  Id. at 211. 
211  Id. 
212  Id. at 210.  
213  Id. at 211 tbl.6. 
214  Id. 
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make school funding more “efficient.” 
Even more notably, the reform has lasted. MERA has succeeded in closing the gap in 
money spent per student between the richest and poorest district. In fiscal year 1993, districts in 
the lowest quartile of per capita income spent about $1,400 less per pupil than districts in the 
highest quartile, whereas by fiscal year 2000, that discrepancy had dropped to $370.215 Because of 
this success, MERA did not experience a significant overhaul until 2007, twenty-three years after 
its implementation.216 These changes were spurred by a successor lawsuit to McDuffy. Although 
this challenge, Hancock v. Massachusetts Commissioner of Education,217 was unsuccessful, it 
renewed interest in the funding formula. 
This renewed interest led the Massachusetts legislature to pass reforms that changed the 
way that local wealth was calculated, increasing transparency and accuracy.218 By fiscal year 
2010, Massachusetts had achieved its goal of creating a progressively-funded education system 
that reflected the needs of low-income communities and students. In that fiscal year, average 
spending in districts with the highest percentage of low-income students was $14,249, whereas 
spending in districts with the lowest percentage of low-income students was $12,458, a difference 
of $1,791.219 After almost twenty years of reforms, Massachusetts flipped its priorities on where it 
sent resources, from the lowest-income districts receiving $1,400 less than the wealthiest districts 
in 1993 to those same low-income districts now receiving almost $1,800 more in 2010.220 
II. REFORM EFFORTS FROM 1970 TO 2014 
The modern era of Illinois school funding reform work began in 1970 with the Sixth 
Illinois Constitutional Convention. By 1970, Illinois’s schools had reached a level of regulatory 
complexity and diversity in the statewide student body similar to that which more recently 
reoccurred in the 2010s.221 The state had also urbanized—and suburbanized—to a point that made 
the funding formula inadequate, much like it is today.222 Thus, this Article’s analysis of recent 
                                                                  
215  MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE PUBLIC 
EDUCATION FINANCING SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS 8 (2013), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/research/ 
reports/2013/07FinancingSystem.pdf. 
216  Id. at 6-7. 
217  822 N.E.2d 1134, 1136-37 (Mass. 2005) (“A majority of the Justices decline to adopt the conclusion of 
the . . . Superior Court that the Commonwealth presently is not meeting its obligations under . . . the Massachusetts 
Constitution.”). 
218  MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 215, at 9. 
219  Id. at 10. 
220  Id. at 7-10. 
221  See The Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/role.html. The anti-poverty and education initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s 
dramatically expanded the federal government’s role in education, including its funding role, changing the way in which 
schools were funded. Id. This culminated in the U.S. Department of Education being elevated to a cabinet level agency in 
1980. Id. 
See also Spinney, supra note 8, at 204-12 (tracing the migration of ethnicities across the Chicago metropolitan area, 
Illinois’s largest urban area). 
222  See Spinney, supra note 8, at 204-12. 
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school funding reform efforts  begins in 1970. 
A. All Talked Out: The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 
Delegates to the 1970 Constitutional Convention spent three days debating solutions to 
the recognized inequity in the Illinois School Funding formula.223 Their talks on the subject came 
toward the end of the Convention, and the timing of their debates did not work in favor of 
reform.224 The Education Article of the Constitution was the last to be given a first reading.225 In 
other words, delegates debated education only days before their pay was to end and the 
Convention was scheduled to wrap up.226 According to Thomas D. Wilson, a political science 
professor at Illinois State University at the time, and his son, John K. Wilson, then a graduate 
student at the University of Chicago, “[d]ealing with a complicated and controversial plan which 
had never been tried before was beyond the energy and ambition of the delegates.”227 
The debates over school funding equity at the 1970 Constitutional Convention frame the 
resulting legislative debates that would follow over the next forty years. The views that emerged 
in the three days in which the Education Article was discussed survive in today’s funding debate. 
Three different proposals for a new Education Article, the basis upon which funding 
decisions are made, came to the floor of the Constitutional Convention.228 The first was a proposal 
on behalf of the convention’s Education Committee by delegate Malcolm Kamin. This plan 
involved the state of Illinois becoming responsible for providing 90% of the cost of K-12 
education in Illinois.229 Further, school districts would be limited to levying no more than 10% of 
the amount of money that had been received from the state.230 This proposal was voted down.231 
However, delegates did not oppose funding equity; they simply did not agree on the proposal that 
had been put before them.232 Indeed, a number of delegates expressed mixed feelings over their 
“no” votes, saying that they voted against it “reluctantly” or because of a “technicality.”233 
The second proposal, an attempt to find middle ground, was put before the convention by 
delegate Louis F. Bottino.234 This proposal required districts to raise up to 50% of their needed 
funds; the state would cover the rest.235 Bottino’s amendment made the state responsible for 
                                                                  
223  4 REC. OF PROCEEDINGS: SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3536-70, 4144-48, 4500-07 (Aug. 
1970) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. 
224  Wilson & Wilson, supra note 1, at 23. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. at 21-22; see also PROCEEDINGS, supra note 223, at 3536-70. 
229  Wilson & Wilson, supra note 1, at 21; see also PROCEEDINGS, supra note 223, at 3536-38. 
230  Id. 
231  Id. 
232  Wilson & Wilson, supra note 1, at 21. 
233  Id. 
234  Id. at 21-22. 
235  Id. at 21. 
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ensuring “substantial parity of education opportunity,” and he was clear that this element would 
be judicially enforceable.236 The amendment represented a compromise between the two sides that 
had formed at the convention, with one group favoring little to no state constitutional commitment 
for funding by the state, and the other group favoring a strong state commitment.237 However, 
Bottino could not garner enough votes from these two camps.238 
Delegate Dawn Clark Netsch provided the final proposal at the convention.239 This 
amendment was simple: “The state has the primary responsibility for financing the system of 
public educational institutions and services.”240 Netsch also stated that the amendment would not 
create a legally enforceable duty; in other words, judges would not be able to use the language to 
compel action by the state.241 At this point in the convention, however, the frustration was 
palpable. In front of the entire convention, Kamin, the delegate who had floated the first proposal, 
stated: “I don’t think the Bottino amendment goes far enough; the Netsch amendment doesn’t go 
anywhere; I want to go home. Let’s vote.”242 The delegates applauded.243 
The next day, the delegates voted to suspend the rules to reconsider the Netsch 
amendment.244 After failed maneuvering on both sides to modify its wording, the amendment was 
eventually passed.245 Although some felt the amendment did not go far enough and some felt it 
went too far, both groups approved it and seemed to believe that the Netsch amendment would do 
for the time being.246 While some delegates voted for the amendment because they believed that it 
placed the responsibility for funding education fully on the state, others believed that this 
responsibility did not exist, as it would not be judicially enforceable.247 Essentially, the split 
convention “adopted a simple statement which left the matter open to the future, hoping that the 
legislature would be moved by it to take action.”248 
In spite of the efforts of many, reform has been slow to occur.249 It seems that the 
General Assembly cannot free itself from the same trap in which the delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention found themselves. In the meantime, millions of students have passed 
through Illinois’s school system.250 Some of those students, mostly white, wealthy students, have 
                                                                  
236  Id. at 21-22.  
237  Id. at 22. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. at 21. 
249  See, e.g., G. Alan Hickrod et al., The Decline and Fall of School Finance Reform in Illinois, 9 J. EDUC. 
FIN. 17, 18 (1983). 
250  See ILL. STATE BD. OF EDUC., SCHOOLS AND DISTRICTS: A PROFILE OF ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN 
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received much from this system, while others, mostly low-income, and many of them students of 
color, have received little.251 
B. Running in Circles: Legislative Efforts 
Beginning with the successful 1973 school finance reform law that was later repealed, 
and ending with a new funding proposal introduced to the Illinois General Assembly in early 
April 2014, the post-Constitutional Convention history of school finance reform is filled with 
starts and stops. Advocates came extremely close to reform in the mid-to-late 1970s, struggled 
through the 1980s, and saw new hope through litigation in the 1990s. A reboot of the decades-old 
debate occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and a return to the acrimony reminiscent of the 
1970s resurfaced in the early 2010s. 
1. Short-Lived Success: The 1970s 
In the early 1970s, the atmosphere seemed perfect for genuine school finance reform.252 
Although little urgency had previously existed, the 1971 Serrano v. Priest253 decision in 
California, discussed in infra Part II.C of this Article, provided the fuel that Illinois lawmakers 
needed to move legislation forward.254 Immediately, different parts of the Illinois government 
sprang into action, each creating its own “blue ribbon” committee to search for solutions to the 
problem of school finance.255 A dedicated group of legislators, using the threat of a possible state 
constitutional challenge to the then-current formula, convinced fellow lawmakers to fall in line 
with reform.256 After the dust settled, following some jockeying between the state education 
department and a separate committee, a less-than-perfect “awful two-headed monster” 
compromise bill emerged from the General Assembly.257 After the passage of this bill, one 
legislator stated that, “We always pass a Christmas tree with a gift hung on it for everybody. We 
figure out the wiring later.”258 
Nevertheless, the 1973 school reform bill became law.259 Enough people had been 
appeased by the bill’s “side payments” to particular constituencies for it to pass.260 The core tenets 
                                                                  
2011-12, SELECTIONS FROM SCHOOL REPORT CARD FILES (2012), available at http://www.isbe.state.il.us/reports/ 
annual12/schools.pdf (noting that the ISBE served 2,066,692 students in the 2011-12 school year, 49% of whom were 
low-income students). 
251  MARTIRE ET AL., supra note 18, at 5-7. 
252  Hickrod, supra note 249, at 17-18. 
253  487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
254  Hickrod, supra note 249, at 17-18. 
255  Id. 
256  See id. at 19. 
257  Id. at 19-20; see H.B. 1484, 78th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 1973), Pub. Act No. 78-215 (codified at 105 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/18-8 (West 1973)) (repealed 1998). 
258  Hickrod, supra note 249, at 20. 
259  Id. 
260  Id. 
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of the law included the “resource equalizer” and the “poverty impaction” provisions.261 Under the 
banner of “equal expenditure for equal effort,” a district would receive more aid from the state if 
it had a high property tax rate but a low assessed value of the property in the district.262 In other 
words, as a district’s property tax rate rose and its property worth dropped or remained low, the 
state would provide more support to the district.263 This mechanism came to be known as the 
“resource equalizer.”264 The poverty impaction portion of the law was simpler: it increased state 
funding to districts as their percentage of low-income students increased.265 Coupled with these 
provisions was a property tax roll-back.266 
The era immediately after the passage of the 1973 reform has been called the “golden 
age” of Illinois school funding.267 Up to that point it was unusual for superintendents to be able to 
rely on the state as a constant and stable funding source.268 By the mid-1970s, the state’s share of 
public school funding had risen dramatically, peaking at 48%.269 This growth in state funding was 
contemporaneous with a steep drop in the disparity among Illinois’s unit and high school 
districts.270 The levels of disparity reached their lowest points when the state was funding schools 
at the highest level from 1976 to 1979.271 However, trouble was on the horizon for the 1973 
reform law, even though it had accomplished exactly what it was meant to in its passage. 
In 1976, a group of property-wealthy districts mounted a campaign to repeal the property 
tax roll-back of the 1973 law.272 These districts wanted to receive more state aid while retaining 
the power to raise money within the district.273 Their campaign was successful, marking the 
beginning of efforts that would chip away at the equity provisions of the 1973 law.274 In 1978, 
wealthier districts also began manipulating the foundational resource equalizer element of the 
law, which guaranteed a minimum payment per student to every district.275 Districts also found 
ways to play the poverty impaction elements of the law in their favor.276 The equity built into the 
1973 law was being eroded. 
                                                                  
261  Id. at 21.  
262  Id. 
263  See id. 
264  Id. at 20. 
265  Id. at 21. 
266  Id. at 22. 
267  Id. at 22. 
268  See id. 
269  Jacquelyn Heard, Battle Lines Drawn on Schools Amendment, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 15, 1992), available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-10-15/news/9204030405_1_poorer-districts-school-funding-formula-public-
education. 
270  Hickrod, supra note 249, at 30.  
271  See id. 
272  Id. at 22. 
273  Id. 
274  Id. 
275  Id. 
276  Id. 
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By 1980, “that awful two-headed monster” was finally slain.277 Rewarding districts for 
taxing more turned out to simply be incompatible with Illinoisans’ clamors for property tax 
relief.278 The resource equalizer became unrecognizable, and a new alternate method of state aid 
was designed, the effect of which was to provide more money to property-wealthier districts.279 
Additionally, the poverty impaction provision was further weakened in both 1981 and 1982.280 
The increase in state subsidies that had come with the 1973 law had vanished by 1982.281 As the 
1973 law was rolled back, so were the gains in equity the law had made. By the 1982-1983 school 
year, not only had virtually all gains been lost, but both elementary and unit districts had more 
disparity than in 1973.282 
G. Alan Hickrod, the former director of the Center for the Study of Educational Finance 
at Illinois State University, opined that the 1973 law failed for three different reasons.283 First, the 
state’s urban centers and their suburbs were considered the “winners” of the 1973 reform, and the 
rural districts in downstate Illinois felt as if they had been left out.284 This, coupled with the 
“downstate revolt” of the 1976 and 1978 elections, eventually caused the changes in the law that 
diverted more money to property-wealthy districts in the middle of the state.285 
Second, the funds the state had been using to increase state aid to school districts began 
to dry up.286 Whereas the state was able to make large increases in the few years after 1973, local 
revenue was unable to sustain these increases.287 Indeed, by the early 1980s, state funding began 
to decrease.288 
Third, wealthier districts were able to increase both tax rates and assessed property 
valuation faster than poorer districts.289 Under the resource equalizer portion of the law, the 
wealthier districts were then able to divert a larger portion of state funds to themselves.290 Thus, 
as state aid was drying up, wealthier districts were not only able to increase their own local 
revenues, but also were taking more of what little state aid was left.291 
There are lessons to be learned from the 1970s and early 1980s. One lesson that was lost 
on the General Assembly of the 1970s is that equity is achieved when the state government and 
                                                                  
277  Id. at 23. 
278  See id. at 22-23. 
279  Id. at 23. 
280  Id. 
281  Id. 
282  Id. at 30. 
283  Id. at 23. 
284  Id. 
285  Id. 
286  Id. 
287  Id. 
288  Id. 
289  Id. 
290  Id. 
291  Id. at 23-24. 
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local districts join forces.292 As times and circumstances change, effective laws must also change. 
Whereas a consensus was built under the pressure of urgency in 1973, this unlikely coalition 
could not stick together to provide the needed tweaks to the law as conditions changed at both the 
local and state levels.293 Certain tweaks to the 1973 law arguably could have maintained the gains 
in equity and prevented the law’s demise. 
Additionally, maintaining coalitions, such as those built to pass the 1973 reform, 
becomes paramount. There will almost certainly be tough situations that stretch the efficacy of a 
law, and when it comes time to provide small changes to keep the law alive, the coalition that 
provided the original vision for the law becomes indispensable. Constant vigilance and 
monitoring techniques are necessary to growing and maintaining equity. Unfortunately, when it 
comes to school funding equity, the arc of history does not always bend toward justice. At the 
very least, this arc has a propensity to twist and turn, and it takes the determined efforts of 
advocates to keep reform heading in the right direction. 
2. Struggle and a New Hope: The 1980s and 1990s 
The 1980s saw some smaller legislative moves to reform the education finance system. 
However, the large reforms typical of the 1970s were absent from any education finance 
conversation in Springfield. In 1984, Illinois placed the reforms of the 1970s directly in the 
rearview mirror, returning formally to a foundation-type school funding formula.294 
In 1989, the state income tax was raised to 3%.295 This resulted in an increase in funding, 
but efforts to ensure adequacy among all schools did not gain traction again until 1991.296 That 
year an attempt to add the “fundamental right to an adequate education” to the Illinois 
Constitution narrowly failed, largely due to the opposition of then-Governor Jim Edgar.297 Such 
language could have had far-reaching implications in Illinois school funding reform. 
Luckily, in 1992, new hope arrived for education finance equity advocates. In that year, 
thirty-seven school districts, eleven parents, eleven students, and the Committee for Educational 
Rights filed a complaint in Cook County against Edgar, alleging that the disparity in funding 
levels among districts violated the Equal Protection Clause and Education Article of the Illinois 
Constitution.298 Community for Educational Rights v. Edgar was a landmark case in Illinois 
school finance, but the plaintiffs failed to make it beyond the state’s motion to dismiss stage, 
although they appealed this decision unsuccessfully up to the state supreme court.299 This case is 
                                                                  
292  See id. at 24. 
293  See id. at 36 (noting the challenges in building coalitions in state and local politics to construct and 
maintain equity in school funding). 
294  G.A. HICKROD, SIGNIFICANT DATES IN ILLINOIS SCHOOL FINANCE 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.ctbaonline.org/sites/default/files/reports/ctba.limeredstaging.com/node/add/repository-
report/1386536159/FS_2006.01.01_History%20of%20School%20Funding%20in%20Illinois.pdf. 
295  Id. 
296  Id. 
297  Id. at 2. 
298  Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar (Edgar I), 641 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (referring to the 
original complaint filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County).  
299  Comm. for. Educ. Rights v. Edgar (Edgar II), 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1180-81 (Ill. 1996) (affirming the trial 
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further discussed in infra Part II.C.1 of the Article. 
3. Post-Edgar: The Late 1990s into the 2000s and Beyond 
After the constitutional challenge to the funding formula failed in the Illinois Supreme 
Court in 1996,300 the legislature attempted to rectify the inadequacy and inequity alleged by the 
Committee for Educational Rights. In December of 1997, the General Assembly formed the 
Education Funding Advisory Board (“EFAB”).301 The board was charged with “mak[ing] 
recommendations . . . to the General Assembly for the foundation level . . . and for the 
supplemental General State Aid grant level . . . for districts with high concentrations of children 
from poverty.”302 To do this, EFAB was to develop a methodology of calculating an adequate 
foundation level using best practices of districts that have both high academic achievement and 
high concentrations of poverty.303 However, the General Assembly was not bound to follow the 
recommendations of EFAB then—and today, it is still free to disregard EFAB’s advice.304 
EFAB, on its end, has done its job. In 2001, EFAB commissioned Augenblick & Myers 
(“A&M”) of Denver, Colorado to design a system that could be used to determine an appropriate 
foundation level.305 In its analysis, A&M applied a “successful school” approach that used the 
actual spending of school districts in Illinois that were currently meeting student and school 
performance standards.306 A&M used three different metrics—(1) level of success in meeting 
state standards, (2) districts’ socioeconomic status of families and pupils, and (3) spending 
efficiency—to generate a group of schools that emulated best practices in spending and 
achievement.307 A&M then used this system to come to the optimum base cost level for a quality 
education.308 
After this grouping of districts were gathered, A&M adjusted costs for variances between 
districts, such as regional cost-of-living differences, the percentage of students receiving special 
education, and federal funds received by each district.309 A&M then determined the average spent 
among those “successful” districts after considering these adjustments, and this became the base 
cost used to determine an adequate foundation amount.310 Lastly, A&M laid out a number of 
                                                                  
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint). 
300  Id. 
301  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05(M) (West 2014). 
302  Id. 
303  Id. 
304  See id. (citing statutory language which states that EFAB “shall make recommendations” rather than 
required proscriptions).  
305 AUGENBLICK & MYERS, INC., A PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING A BASE COST FIGURE AND AN 
ADJUSTMENT FOR AT-RISK PUPILS THAT COULD BE USED IN THE ILLINOIS SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM 1 (2001), available 
at http://www.isbe.net/EFAB/archive/PDFs/fullreport.pdf. 
306  Id. at 3. 
307  Id. 
308  Id. 
309  Id. at 12-13. 
310  Id. at 15. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss3/1
CAUHORN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/15  11:37 AM 
2015] THE SEARCH FOR THE MAGIC FORMULA 237 
options for providing extra resources for at-risk students.311 
The A&M report has become well-known among advocates for finance equity working 
in Illinois. EFAB used this report to generate its first recommended foundation level to the 
General Assembly for the 2001-2002 school year, totaling $4,560.312 That year, the General 
Assembly followed this EFAB recommendation.313 
However, since then, the General Assembly has not followed EFAB’s suggestions. 
EFAB suggested escalating foundation levels, rising to $5,665 in 2004, $6,405 in 2006, and 
$8,672 in 2014, yet the General Assembly has allowed the gap between the EFAB 
recommendation and the actual foundation level to grow to over $2,500 per pupil by 2014.314 
Indeed, the statutory foundation level set by the General Assembly has not moved from $6,119 
since 2010, when the EFAB recommended amount, indexed to inflation, was $7,388.315 Thus, 
although EFAB fulfilled its statutory duties, the General Assembly has not heeded the suggestions 
of its own created body. 
As a result, in July 2013, several state senators, led by Illinois State Senator Andy Manar 
(a Democrat representing Bunker Hill), formed the Senate Education Funding Advisory 
Committee (“EFAC”) by the passage of Senate Resolution 431.316 EFAC was charged with 
closely examining Illinois’s K-12 funding system and recommending changes where necessary 
with the goal of making the funding system adequate, equitable, and fair to students and 
teachers.317 
In late summer of 2013, EFAC began its investigation of Illinois’s funding formula, 
meeting with eighteen separate interest groups, including teachers’ unions and advocacy 
organizations.318 EFAC also consulted with ISBE, the Massachusetts Department of Education, 
and consulting firm Augenblick, Palaich and Associates.319 The findings and suggestions of 
EFAC are split into ten different areas, providing the broad outlines for a genuinely equitable 
funding system, which are outlined in infra, Part II.C.2. 
C. Fighting for Reform 
The United States has traditionally been a country with education funding disparity, 
which is a result of an unwavering focus on local control and local funding.320 However, every 
                                                                  
311  See id. at 17-24. 
312  EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY BD., ILLINOIS EDUCATION FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS: A REPORT 
SUBMITTED TO THE ILL. GENERAL  ASSEMBLY 9 (2005), available at http://www.isbe.net/efab/pdf/final_report_4-05.pdf. 
313  Id. at 8. 
314  Id. 
315  Id. 
316  SENATE EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY COMM., supra note 61, at 1; see S. Res. 0431, 98th Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill. 2013). 
317  SENATE EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY COMM., supra note 61, at 1. 
318  Id. 
319  Id. at 1-2. 
320  John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War? 57 VAND. L. REV. 
2351, 2355 (2004). 
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state constitution now recognizes a state-level obligation to pay for public education.321 While this 
may indicate the level of importance of education to Americans, laws in each state demonstrate 
Americans’ collective belief that education should be governed and paid for at the local level.322 
Evidently, the current system of local funding and control has led to large disparities among 
districts across the nation.323 
The funding equity movement has long seen litigation as a tool to remedy this inequity. 
In Commonwealth v. Dedham, an 1819 case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
declared that: 
The schools required by the statute are to be maintained for the benefit of the 
whole town, as it is the wise policy of the law to give all the inhabitants equal 
privileges, for the education of their children in the public schools. Nor is it in 
the power of the majority to deprive the minority of this privilege.324 
Early litigation in this area, as states adopted laws and constitutions ensuring education to their 
citizens, was generally unsuccessful, as courts held that education was a non-justiciable issue.325 
However, in 1954, the United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of education and 
the effect it had on American life in Brown v. Board of Education: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must 
be made available to all on equal terms.326 
This statement was made, of course, in the context of race. It would take almost twenty years for a 
court to apply similar logic to resources. 
The first case to do so was Serrano v. Priest.327 The Supreme Court of California, in 
establishing the “Serrano principle,” held that the quality of education in a community must not 
merely be a reflection of the wealth of that community.328 Even more, the Serrano court 
recognized education as a fundamental right that brings with it a series of constitutional 
protections.329 
Serrano generated momentum for reform across the United States, and it was soon time 
for the United States Supreme Court to confront funding equity in education. In 1973, the Court 
                                                                  
321  Id. at 2356.  
322  See id. 
323  See id. at 2355-56. 
324  Id. at 2358 (quoting Commonwealth v. Dedham, 16 Mass. 141, 146 (1819)). 
325  Id. 
326  Id. at 2357-58 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
327  487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
328  Dayton & Dupre, supra note 320, at 2359.  
329  Id. at 2360. 
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decided San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,330 a case that would soon become 
infamous among many education equity advocates. In Rodriguez, Mexican-American parents in 
Texas filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that children in property-poor districts were not being 
equally served by Texas’ school finance system.331 Texas, at the time, utilized a foundation-type 
funding formula similar to that of the current formula in Illinois, through which schools were 
guaranteed by state law a minimum amount of money per pupil.332 During litigation, the state of 
Texas “virtually concede[d]” that its system of relying on property taxes was unequal and that, in 
an equal protection analysis, it would not be able to withstand strict scrutiny.333 Even more, the 
Court reasoned that if it applied strict scrutiny to Texas’s system, such scrutiny would also almost 
certainly invalidate every other state funding formula in the country, as all states had systems that 
relied on property taxes in some way.334 
The outcome of the case turned on which standard of review the Court would apply. The 
Court attacked the reasoning of the Serrano decision, asserting that the term “‘poor’ cannot be . . . 
defined in customary equal protection terms,” and alluding to being termed “poor” as only a 
“relative” term, and not “absolute.”335 Further, the Court refused to recognize the poor as a 
suspect class and therefore concluded that no suspect class was disadvantaged by the funding 
system.336 Lastly, despite recognizing the importance of education, the Court declined to declare 
education to be a fundamental right, which would have triggered strict scrutiny analysis.337 
Instead the Court applied a rational basis test, and upheld the Texas system.338 Throughout its 
decision, the Court enumerated a series of concerns that continue to echo throughout equity 
litigation today: 
(1) criticism of the plaintiffs’ statistical data and conclusions; (2) fear of 
engaging in judicial activism; (3) fear of opening the floodgates of litigation in 
other areas of social services; (4) concerns related to judicial competence in an 
area where courts generally have limited expertise; (5) the importance of 
judicial deference to the legislature in this area; and (6) the need for the 
plaintiffs to address their grievances to the legislature instead of the courts.339 
The Rodriguez decision was soon conditioned in 1982 by the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Plyler v. Doe.340 Some years after Rodriguez, Texas passed a law withholding funding for the 
education of children who were not legally in the United States and allowed school districts to 
                                                                  
330  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973). 
331  Id. 
332  Id. at 9. 
333  Id. at 16.  
334  Id. at 16-17. 
335  Id. at 19. 
336  Id. at 28. 
337  Id. at 37. 
338  Id. at 55. 
339  Dayton & Dupre, supra note 320, at 2363 (internal citations omitted). 
340  457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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deny these children enrollment.341 In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that this particular 
law was unconstitutional.342 Instead of applying a rational basis test, the Court distinguished 
education from other social welfare programs, analyzing the Texas law under a form of 
intermediate scrutiny.343 The Court reasoned that the law “imposes a lifetime hardship on a 
discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status,” and explained that “by 
denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of 
our civic institutions . . . .”344 This language would later be adopted by a number of state-based 
litigants alleging a relative deprivation of education.345 
1. Illinois Litigation Efforts 
The first case to present a direct challenge to Illinois’s school funding formula was 
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar.346 Edgar was filed in 1990, one year before the failed 
attempt to modify the state constitution to make education a fundamental right in Illinois.347 
Thirty-seven school districts joined the Committee as plaintiffs, as did a number of parents and 
students.348 The plaintiffs cited data from the 1989-1990 school year to illustrate the disparity in 
Illinois: the average tax base in the wealthiest 10% of elementary schools was over thirteen times 
the average tax base in the poorest 10%.349 The disparity in high school and unit districts was also 
striking, at an 8.1 to 1 ratio in high school districts, and a 7 to 1 ratio in unit districts.350 
The plaintiffs alleged five different counts in their complaint.351 Count I alleged a 
violation of the state constitution’s equal protection clause, Count II alleged a violation of the 
state constitution’s prohibition against special legislation, and Count III alleged a violation of 
Article X of the state constitution, the Education Article.352 These three counts sought a 
declaratory judgment that the formula was not adequately equalizing school resources among 
districts of varying property wealth.353 Counts IV and V of the plaintiffs’ complaint attacked the 
state’s grant-based funding system for preschool, alleging that because the funding serves only a 
fraction of the at-risk children who need services, the system violates the state’s equal protection 
                                                                  
341  Id. at 205. 
342  Id. at 230. 
343  Id. at 223-24; accord Dayton & Dupre, supra note 320, at 2367. 
344  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. 
345  Dayton & Dupre, supra note 320, at 2367. 
346  641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  
347  See HICKROD, supra note 294, at 2; Complaint, Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, No. 90 CH-
11097 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty. Nov. 13, 1990). 
348  Edgar I, 641 N.E.2d at 604. 
349  Edgar II, 672 N.E.2d at 1182. 
350  Id. 
351  Id. 
352  Id. (citing Ill. Const. art. X, § 1). 
353  Edgar II, 672 N.E.2d at 1182. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss3/1
CAUHORN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/15  11:37 AM 
2015] THE SEARCH FOR THE MAGIC FORMULA 241 
clause (Count IV) and the Education Article of the state constitution (Count V).354 
The Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, 
and the appellate court affirmed.355 On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the plaintiffs 
declined to challenge the special legislation claim (Count II), and focused instead on the claims 
concerning the state constitution’s equal protection clause and Education Article.356 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint.357 In its Education Article analysis, the Edgar court looked at the legislative and 
committee history of the Article in the 1970 Constitution.358 The focus of their analysis centered 
on the Article’s use of the terms “high quality” and “efficient”359 in stating that “[t]he State shall 
provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.”360 
Using transcript excerpts of the debate surrounding the passage of this article, the court concluded 
that “efficiency” did not mean educational equality in the minds of the framers.361 Specifically, 
the court stated that “[t]o ignore this careful and deliberate choice by interpreting the efficiency 
requirement as an enforceable guarantee of equality would do violence to the framers’ 
understanding of the [E]ducation [A]rticle.”362 Further, the court reasoned that no intent toward 
equality existed behind the use of the word “efficiency” simply because the framers discussed 
their concerns about the unequal nature of Illinois school funding.363 
Concerning the Education Article’s language that schools should be of “high quality,” 
the Edgar court again looked to the debates of the 1970 Constitutional Convention.364 Using the 
fact that the framers declined to “define all of the ramifications of ‘high quality,’” the court 
refused to come to any judicial definition of high quality as it applies to education.365 The court 
went on to confront the fact that a significant number of other states’ high courts did move to 
define high quality in education, and, in very clear and straightforward language, refused to 
follow the lead of those states.366 In this portion, the court effectively closed the door to any 
judicial enforcement of the state’s Education Article, declaring the matter “outside the sphere of 
the judicial function.”367 
The court then confronted the plaintiffs’ allegations that the funding formula violated the 
                                                                  
354  Id. 
355  Id. at 1182-83. 
356  Id. at 1183. 
357  Id. at 1181.  
358  Id. at 1185. 
359  Id. at 1187-93. 
360  ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (emphasis added). 
361  Edgar II, 672 N.E.2d at 1187.  
362  Id. 
363  Id. 
364  Id. at 1190-91. 
365  Id. at 1191. 
366  See id. at 1191-93 (outlining nine different cases from other states where courts intervened in defining a 
quality education). 
367  Id. at 1193. 
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state constitution’s equal protection clause.368 The court directly applied the U.S Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Rodriguez, declining to distinguish the federal Constitution from the state 
constitution.369 Moreover, the fact that education may enable citizens of the state to utilize 
uncontroverted fundamental rights such as voting was not enough to persuade the court to declare 
education to be a fundamental right in Illinois.370 The court invoked the language of Rodriguez, 
stating: “we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the 
citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.”371 Echoing Rodriguez, 
the court emphasized the need for local control and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.372 
Edgar nearly eliminated any chance of using the courts and the state constitution in 
Illinois to advance funding equity. However, a sliver of hope remained in Justice Freeman’s 
dissent. Justice Freeman argued that, although many issues in school funding may be outside the 
scope of judicial interference, determining whether a law violates the constitution is fully within 
the duties of the judiciary.373 Justice Freeman asserted that when the state constitution declares 
that it is the duty of the state to run an education system, that duty spreads to all three branches of 
the state government, including the judiciary.374 According to Justice Freeman, by refusing to 
confront the issue of education finance as non-justiciable, the court abandoned its constitutional 
responsibility to determine whether the legislature had acted within the confines of the state 
constitution.375 
Edgar placed a very high bar on any future school funding litigation. However, in 1999, 
three years after Edgar, the issue of school funding once again was brought before the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Lewis E. v. Spagnolo.376 The plaintiffs in Lewis E., a class of schoolchildren in 
East St. Louis, modified their strategy in light of the Edgar and Rodriguez decisions. 
In their complaint to the St. Clair County Circuit Court, the plaintiffs laid out the 
deficiencies in the education being provided to the children of East St. Louis.377 Chief Justice 
Freeman of the Illinois Supreme Court summarized the educational deficiencies laid out by the 
plaintiffs in their complaint, citing: 
numerous examples of unsafe conditions in the schools which . . . are the result 
of the District defendants’ neglect, including: fire hazard; chronic flooding; 
structural flaws, such as falling plaster and cracked walls and roofs; 
malfunctioning heating systems; unsanitary restrooms; rooms sealed-off due to 
                                                                  
368  Id.  
369  Id. at 1193-94. 
370  Id. at 1194. 
371  Id. at 1195 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36).  
372  Id. at 1195-96. 
373  Id. at 1202-1203 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
374  Id. at 1202. 
375  Id. at 1204. 
376  710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999). 
377  Id. at 801; see Complaint, Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, No. 95 CH 0097 (Cir. Ct. of St. Clair Cnty. Apr. 12, 
1995). 
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the presence of asbestos; broken windows; burnt-out light bulbs; nonworking 
water fountains; the presence of cockroaches and rats; and cold, nonnutritious 
[sic] lunches in the cafeterias.378 
The plaintiffs alleged that this was the fault of ISBE because it was the State Board’s duty to 
oversee District 189 in East St. Louis.379 
In an acknowledgment of both Rodriguez and Edgar, the plaintiffs did not argue 
discrepancies in education between districts, but rather a complete failure of the state to provide 
any kind of basic education.380 The Lewis E. court reaffirmed Edgar, asserting that education is 
not an area in which the judiciary is entitled to create remedies.381 Further, the court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ other arguments, refusing to recognize a violation of the federal due process clause, the 
state due process clause, the Illinois School Code, or common law.382 
However, in a strongly worded dissent joined by Justice Harrison, Justice Freeman once 
again attacked the court’s reasoning that education is simply non-justiciable.383 Justice Freeman 
vividly described the decrepit nature of the schools in East St. Louis: 
Strangers wander in and out of junior high schools. Fire alarms malfunction, 
and firefighters find emergency exits chained shut as they rescue children from 
burning schools. 
. . . . 
In winter, students sit through classes wearing heavy coats because broken 
windows and faulty boilers go unprepared . . . School libraries are locked or 
destroyed by fire.384 
Calling upon the court to do its duty to enforce the state constitution, Justice Freeman 
distinguished the actions of the Illinois Supreme Court from those of the Ohio Supreme Court in 
DeRolph v. Ohio385: 
The judiciary was created as part of a system of checks and balances. We will 
not dodge our responsibility by asserting that this case involves a non[-
]justiciable political question. To do so is unthinkable. We refuse to undermine 
                                                                  
378  710 N.E.2d at 801. 
379  Id. 
380  See id. at 804 (outlining the plaintiffs’ argument, which is distinguished from that of the plaintiffs in 
Edgar II, 672 N.E.2d 1178, and Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1). 
381  Id. 
382  Id. at 805 (federal due process clause); id. at 812 (state due process clause); id. at 815 (Illinois School 
Code); id. at 816 (common law). 
383  Id. at 818 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
384  Id. at 817. 
385  677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
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our role as judicial arbiters and to pass our responsibilities on to the lap of the 
General Assembly.386 
Justice Freeman argued that the Illinois Supreme Court did exactly that in the Lewis E. decision: 
abandon its constitutional duty to the detriment of children.387 
Although the urgency with which Justice Freeman wrote, and the fact that he was now 
joined by Justice Harrison, was a silver lining to the Lewis E. decision, advocates were now 
forced back to square one. 
A decade later, a different approach to the issue was made in Carr v. Koch.388 Carr did 
not rely on the Education Article, nor did it emphasize any disparate effects on students.389 
Rather, Carr was a taxpayer-equity suit, alleging that the Illinois funding formula led to a 
disparate impact on the taxpayers of the state of Illinois, as property-poor districts had to pay 
taxes at a higher rate to make up for a lack of funds in violation of the Illinois equal protection 
clause.390 In essence, according to the Carr plaintiffs, two owners of property in low-wealth areas, 
the state’s funding formula served no rational purpose.391 Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that 
their complaint was not barred by Edgar as local districts no longer exercise control over their 
own actions, but instead the ISBE had control.392 In support of this contention, the plaintiffs cited 
the requirement that districts follow ISBE-promulgated learning standards, that students take 
ISBE-mandated standardized tests, and that if districts do not meet ISBE-mandated performance 
goals under these standards and tests, districts face harsh consequences from ISBE.393 Because of 
this control over school districts, the plaintiffs alleged that ISBE and the state of Illinois were the 
but-for cause of varying, conflicted tax rates.394 
The Carr court did not adhere to the plaintiffs’ logic, and held that the connection 
between the actions of ISBE and the state were too tenuous for the plaintiffs to establish 
standing.395 According to the court, because ISBE was not directly forcing the districts to tax at a 
certain level, the plaintiffs’ argument of control failed.396 In support of this, the Carr court pointed 
out that the funding formula, learning standards, and testing provisions were addressed in separate 
statutes.397 Because the court dismissed the claim on standing, it did not confront the equal 
protection issue raised by the plaintiffs.398 
                                                                  
386  Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 818-19 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (quoting DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d at 737). 
387  See Lewis E., 710 N.E.2d at 818-19 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
388  981 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 2012). 
389  See id. 
390  Id. at 327-28.  
391  Id. at 329. 
392  Id. 
393  Id. 
394  Id. at 329, 333. 
395  Id. at 333. 
396  Id. at 336. 
397  Id. at 334. 
398  Id.  
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The plaintiffs in each of these cases all relied on the constitution of either the United 
States or Illinois to stake their claim. The Illinois Supreme Court has made it clear that it is 
adverse to education equity claims of this nature. However, in 2003, the General Assembly passed 
the Illinois Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”).399 This Act allowed an entire new type of claim to be 
brought. 
Chicago Urban League v. Illinois400 was filed in 2008 and made use of the newly passed 
ICRA.401 Like education equity cases before it, Urban League asserts that Illinois’s funding 
formula is not meeting the needs of the children and taxpayers of the state of Illinois.402 However, 
the case, which is still in pre-trial litigation as of this writing, asserts a number of novel 
arguments.403 
More than anything else, Urban League ties the issue of race to education and taxpayer 
equity in context of the school funding formula.404 The plaintiff in Urban League points out that a 
disproportionate number of students in areas with the lowest property wealth reside in majority-
minority districts (“MMD”).405 In particular, the plaintiff focuses on District 188 in Brooklyn, 
Illinois.406 District 188 ranks 386th out of 395 consolidated school districts in EAV per pupil.407 
Ninety-seven percent of District 188’s students are considered low-income students, while nearly 
all of the district’s students are members of a minority group.408 Brooklyn is just one example of a 
MMD ranking toward the bottom of EAV per pupil in Illinois; indeed, the plaintiff provided data 
in its complaint that a disproportionate number of MMDs were toward the bottom of EAV 
rankings per pupil.409 Because of this, plaintiff claims that the Illinois funding system has a 
discriminatory and disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic students in violation of 
the ICRA.410 
In addition to the plaintiff’s first count (Count I) concerning the disparate impact on 
minority students, the plaintiff in Urban League also filed four additional counts against the State 
of Illinois.411 Count II alleged that the funding formula violated the uniformity of taxation 
provision of the Illinois Constitution,412 an allegation similar to that made by the plaintiffs in 
Carr. 
                                                                  
399  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/1 to 23/5 (West 2014). 
400  No. 08 CH 30490, 2009 WL 1632604, at *1-2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 2009). 
401  Id. at *1-2. 
402  Id. at *1. 
403  See id. at *2. 
404  See id. at *1-2. 
405  Id. at *1.  
406  Id. 
407  Id. 
408  Id. 
409  Id. at *3. 
410  Id. 
411  Id. at *2. 
412  Id. 
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In Count III, the plaintiff alleged that the funding formula violates the Education Article 
of the Illinois Constitution.413 This is the same argument dismissed in Edgar; however, in this 
case, the plaintiff stressed that the Illinois local learning objectives, which schools are mandated 
to implement by statute,414 provide a mechanism for the court to define a high-quality 
education.415 Further, as the General Assembly formed EFAB, and the General Assembly has not 
funded education at the EFAB-recommended baseline, the court not only has academic standards, 
but also financial standards by which to evaluate the constitutionality of the funding law.416 
Because of these changes, the plaintiff argued that the court was not bound to follow Edgar, and 
that it could find the State of Illinois and the ISBE to be in violation of the state constitution.417 
Lastly, the plaintiff’s Counts IV and V alleged that the funding formula violated the state 
constitution’s equal protection clause in respect to the inferior education being provided to 
African-American and Hispanic students, as well as students living in low property wealth 
districts.418 
The trial court dismissed Counts II through V, citing Edgar issues of whether the state 
and ISBE have actual control over local property taxes, and equal protection clause precedent.419 
Further, the court granted the state’s motion to dismiss these counts because of the state’s 
sovereign immunity, and denied an exemption in this instance.420 However, the court did not 
dismiss Count I against ISBE—the count alleging a violation of ICRA.421 Based on the data 
presented by the plaintiff and the fact that ISBE implements the school funding formula, the court 
reasoned that the plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to show that ISBE’s actions had a disparate and 
discriminatory impact on minority students.422 
At the time of this writing, Urban League is still in pre-trial litigation.423 The ping-pong 
nature of motions and discovery disputes in Urban League, as well as the fact that the case was 
initially filed in 2008, demonstrates the challenge in using litigation to fuel funding reform: 
litigation is both time-consuming and costly.424 
On the other hand, Urban League is a reason for advocates to have hope. The trial court 
acknowledged that not all funding equity cases will be dismissed by the courts. If Urban League 
succeeds in declaring the Illinois funding system illegal, the courts can not only bar ISBE from 
                                                                  
413  Id. 
414  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3.63 (2015). 
415  2009 WL 1632604, at *7-8. 
416  Id.  
417  Id. 
418  Id. at *2. 
419  Id. at *6-9. 
420  Id. at *10. 
421  Id. at *11. 
422  Id. at *3. 
423  See Electronic Docket Search, Cook County Clerk of the Circuit Court (No. 2008-CH-30490), 
www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org (select “Online Case Info” in sidebar, select “Full Electronic Docket Search,” select 
Division Name: “Chancery,” and enter case number: 2008-CH-30490). 
424  See id. 
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continuing to implement the disparate system, but can also effectively provide political cover for 
legislators to reform the school funding system. Even more, the case continues to raise awareness, 
and there is evidence that pending litigation has compelled the legislature to act in the past.425 
Considering the recent developments regarding EFAC in the General Assembly, Urban League 
can supply the equity movement with the necessary urgency to pass legislation. 
2. EFAC’s Suggestions for Illinois 
On January 31, 2014, EFAC presented its final report to the General Assembly.426 The 
report contained ten areas to consider for reform, each area outlining different steps that the state 
could take to make the funding formula more equitable and adequate.427 These suggested reforms 
were built on a foundation to which numerous advocacy and research groups contributed.428 In its 
final report, EFAC combines best practices from other states, current research on what children 
need to succeed, and insight from education and advocacy groups on the front lines in 
education.429 
First, EFAC suggests that all separate state funding streams be collapsed into a simple 
foundation funding formula.430 Currently, state aid is split into more than eight different funding 
streams.431 In addition to the GSA (41% of state funding) and poverty grant (26%) provided by 
the state, funding is also provided through a transportation program (10%), early childhood 
education (4%), a bilingual student program (1%), and other miscellaneous programs (2%).432 On 
top of that, the City of Chicago receives its state funding through a block grant (8% of total state 
funding) that is not part of the normal GSA or poverty grant calculations.433 Combining all of 
these funding streams into a simple foundation formula would, according to EFAC, clarify state 
funding for districts and make state funding more stable and predictable for districts.434 Even 
more, 96% of operational state funding would be equalized based on a district’s wealth under this 
formula, whereas only 45% of state funding is currently equalized.435 
Second, EFAC suggests that high-need students should receive additional funding by 
adding certain weights to the funding formula depending on different types of needs.436 At-risk 
students, as defined by whether a student receives services such as food stamps or Medicaid from 
                                                                  
425  See, e.g., Hickrod, supra note 249, at 18 (arguing that California’s Serrano decision, discussed in supra 
Part II.C, was on the minds of Illinois legislators in the early 1970s, compelling them to act on school finance reform). 
426  See SENATE EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY COMM., supra note 61. 
427  Id. at 2-3. 
428  Id. at 1. 
429  See id. at 1-2. 
430  Id. at 3. 
431  Id. 
432  Id. 
433  Id. 
434  Id. at 3-4. 
435  Id. at 4. 
436  Id. at 5. 
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the Illinois Department of Human Services, would receive a weight of 0.25.437 English-language 
learners would receive a weight of 0.20.438 Special Education students would receive a weight 
based the type of services they receive.439 Even gifted students would receive a small twenty-five 
to fifty dollar grant, and as a control measure, there would be a percentage cap on the number of 
students who could be categorized as gifted.440 
The third and fourth recommendations by EFAC are related. EFAC recommends that any 
increase in spending be accompanied by provisions for an increase in academic performance.441 
Similarly, EFAC’s fourth recommendation is that districts account for how education dollars are 
being spent by schools.442 Greater accountability will provide the transparency needed to ensure 
that any disparities that exist between schools are justified.443 For example, a school with a high 
number of special education students may reasonably receive more money than a school with an 
average number of such students. 
In the same way, recommendations five and six are also similar. In its fifth 
recommendation, EFAC proposes that any new funding formula should establish a minimum 
amount that each district will receive.444 The sixth recommendation is that any new law have a 
hold-harmless provision that will allow districts to adjust to new funding levels over three to five 
years.445 
EFAC’s seventh recommendation involves an improvement in the way districts measure 
their ability to pay.446 A bit of history is needed to explain this provision. In the early 1990s, the 
counties that encompassed the majority of Chicagoland passed property tax growth caps.447 
Eventually, the ability to enact this cap spread to the rest of Illinois.448 As education costs grew in 
these counties—and property tax revenue began to stagnate—the General Assembly passed a 
modification to the school funding formula that allowed districts in these areas to perform a 
complex series of calculations in order to make up for lost revenue.449 This has become known as 
the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law adjustment, which is paid out by the state.450 EFAC 
claims that “it was inappropriate to use the education funding formula for property tax relief,” and 
                                                                  
437  Id. at 6. 
438  Id. 
439  Id.  
440  Id. at 7. 
441  Id. 
442  Id. 
443  Id. 
444  Id. at 7-8. 
445  Id.  
446  Id. at 8. 
447  TED DABROWSKI ET AL., UNDERSTANDING ILLINOIS’ BROKEN EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM: A PRIMER 
ON GENERAL STATE AID 12 (2013). 
448  Id. 
449  Id. 
450  Id.; see 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-8.05(G) (describing how the Property Tax Extension 
Limitation Law adjustment applies to school districts). 
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that a better measure to determine a district’s ability to pay should be devised.451 
EFAC’s eighth recommendation concerns a problem unique to Illinois: disparate 
property tax revenue by type of organization of district.452 In Illinois, districts can organize into 
elementary school, middle school, high school, or unit districts.453 Unit districts are those districts 
that contain all levels of schools, while other types of districts are named for the type of schools 
they contain. Currently, there is a disincentive in the property tax structure for specific-type 
districts to consolidate into unit districts.454 This should be rectified, as unit districts are more 
economically sound, and provide a more efficient use of tax dollars.455 
The ninth recommendation concerns the mandates that ISBE often places on districts.456 
Many of these mandates are unfunded, yet required.457 EFAC recommends that input be taken 
from all impacted groups to determine if the number of these mandates can be reduced.458 
Tenth, and finally, EFAC recommends that transparency pervade any funding system 
utilized by Illinois.459 Such transparency enables policymakers to tweak the law and ensure that 
equity and efficiency are maximized.460 
III. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt a long road ahead for advocates trying to enact EFAC’s 
recommendations. However, EFAC has provided the broad strokes of genuine reform. The 
lessons contained in the recent history of Illinois school funding reform would go far in ensuring 
not only that this reform be enacted, but also that it weathers future storms and changes with the 
needs of Illinois. History is clear: without learning from these lessons, true reform has little 
chance of taking hold. 
First, any movement to change the funding system must be supported by a well-
organized core of supporters who have a lasting, clear vision. Such a group might have prevented 
the piece-by-piece disassembly of the 1973 reform. Additionally, such a focused group is 
necessary to break the circular nature of reform efforts encapsulated by the 1970 Constitutional 
Convention and represented in the current era by EFAB. Pressure must be put on the General 
Assembly to follow through with the promises it makes to Illinois children, and single-minded 
advocacy will be able to break the cycle of inaction. Of course, it is far easier for change to occur 
                                                                  
451  SENATE EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY COMM., supra note 61, at 8. 
452  See id. at 9. 
453  See id. 
454  Id. 
455  See Bd. of Educ. of Hamilton Cnty. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Reg’l Bd. of Sch. Tr. of Jefferson & 
Hamilton Counties, 121 Ill. App. 3d 848, 852 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Over the last four decades, the General Assembly has 
enacted legislation to promote larger, economically sound school districts so as to better the State’s educational 
facilities.”).  
456  SENATE EDUC. FUNDING ADVISORY COMM., supra note 61, at 9. 
457  Id. 
458  Id. 
459  Id. 
460  See id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
CAUHORN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/15  11:37 AM 
250 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.3 
when a legislature has a court order requiring action. Thus, the Urban League case should not be 
viewed as separate from the overall equity and adequacy movement. The simple threat of 
litigation has moved legislatures to action. 
Second, any reform must take into account the incredibly complex nature of the school 
funding debate, striking a balance between transparency, clarity, and the complexity needed to 
generate adequacy and equity. This is likely the most difficult part of reform. Massachusetts 
provides as a great example in this area. The local control provisions in the law have allowed 
enough stakeholders to get involved to create a critical mass of understanding among 
Massachusetts’s voters. This critical mass of local control has undoubtedly contributed to 
Massachusetts’s lasting success in school finance reform. 
Third, the context of this entire issue cannot be lost. In the short term, the consequences 
of finance reform may affect political careers, jobs, and taxes, but in the long term, finance reform 
will affect millions of Illinois children. In many ways, this is a fight for the future of Illinois 
children and the communities they live in. No Illinois school should ever again come close to the 
deplorable conditions described in Lewis E. No matter what budget issues arise, Illinois can do far 
better. 
The time is ripe for funding reform. EFAC has paved the way, and stakeholders are 
ready to act. The children of Illinois have waited too long. 
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